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West German Constitutionalism
and Church-State Relations

by Donald P. Kommers
University of Notre Dame

Introduction

The complex structure of church-state relations in West Germany

arises out of numerous provisions of the Basic Law that combine
features of both separation and accommodation. The Basic Law's

separationist features are expressed in various guarantees of
religious liberty and in the ban on the establishment of a state
church. Its accommodationist features appear in constitutional
provisions on religious education as well as in articles, taken over
from the Weimar Constitution, that confer upon the established
churches a special juridical status enjoyed by no other nongovern
mental entity.1 The arguably diverse goals of the religion clauses
are difficult to reconcile, creating dilemmas similar to problems
raised by the tension between the "establishment" and "free

exercise" clauses of the United States Constitution. In the German

understanding, however, these dilemmas collapse under the weight
of an interpretative approach that seeks to bring divergent clauses

into harmony with one another and with the values of the Basic

Law as a whole.

In the interest of both clarity and brevity, I have organized this
essay around three principles that define the basic structure of
church-state relations in West Germany, namely, neutrality,
autonomy, and accommodation. Neutrality steers the state away

from identification with the church and commands it to treat all

religions equally under the law; autonomy, which is really a
subcategory of neutrality, expresses the idea that church and state

must remain free to govern their affairs independently of each
other; accommodation, finally, not only permits but also requires
certain connections or levels of cooperation between church and
state. The three concepts, like the religion clauses, join one another
in uneasy collaboration. In the hands of the Federal Constitutional

Court, however, they have advanced into a relationship of

reciprocity and mutual fertilization.
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Neutrality
After examining all the religion clauses of the Basic Law, including

the Weimar articles, the Federal Constitutional Court concluded,
in a seminal case, that the West German state, "as the home of all
citizens, is bound by ideological and religious neutrality."2 The
theme of neutrality resonates through the constitutional law of
church-state relations in the Federal Republic. A particular judi
cial vision of the human personality evokes this theme. Religion is
so central to human existence, the Federal Constitutional Court has

suggested, that any interference with religious belief or its

expression, or any display of partiality for a given belief or set of

beliefs, would violate the principle of human dignity that the

state is bound, under Article 1, "to respect and protect." After all,
religious belief or other conviction held with the force of religious

faith deals with ultimate values, touching the very core of the
human personality.

Article 4 is the cornerstone of the Basic Law's religious liberty
provisions. It guarantees "freedom of faith, conscience, and creed,

religious or ideological," secures the "undisturbed practice of
religion," and upholds the right of conscientious objection to
military service. Unlike several other guaranteed rights, and

apart from the paragraph on conscientious objection, Article 4 is
cast in absolute terms: it contains no reservation clause limiting
freedom of religious belief or exercise, which means that religious
expression can be regulated only by some other value explicitly set

forth in the Constitution.3 In this respect, as implied in previous
remarks, the Basic Law accords a higher level of protection to
religious belief than to expression based on political, social, or

economic considerations.

As judicially defined, the concept of neutrality requires both
separation of church and state and tolerance of religious diversity.
The constitutional command that "[tjhere shall be no state church"

embraces the core principle of separation although, as we shall see

below, its interpretation has avoided the rigid separatism of

American constitutional theory. The principle of tolerance, on the
other hand, obliges the state to respect and protect all manner of
religious belief. Accordingly, the Federal Constitutional Court has
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ruled that courts may not compel witnesses to take religious oaths

against their will, that the state may not impose a criminal

penalty on a husband who allowed his wife to die because of her
refusal on religious grounds to accept a blood transfusion, and that

an administrative judge violated a Jewish lawyer's right to

freedom of conscience when he refused at the latter's request to
remove from the courtroom a conspicuously displayed crucifix.4

In the German understanding of neutrality, however, the principle

of tolerance does not imply indifference to religious belief or its
exercise, for freedom of religion, like other fundamental rights, is

both negative and positive in character. As the constitutional

rulings in the previous paragraph indicate, the negativity of the
right prevents the state from invading the domain of religious
belief. Its positivity, on the other hand, requires the state affirma
tively to ensure that the social and cultural milieu is conducive to

the expression of religiously inspired thought and activity. If

religion is so crucially important to the wholeness of life,

furnishing the basis of linkage to transcendent values—that is, if it

is an identity-defining attribute of personhood—then under the
order of values propounded in the Basic Law the proper constitu
tionalist agenda is the creation of an environment that encourages
persons to manifest their religious personalities. In short, the state

should make it easy and not hard for them to practice their

religion; they should not have to make sacrifices to exercise the
fundamental right of religious freedom.

What constitutes the practice or exercise of religion was partially
settled in the Rumpelkammer case,5 another seminal decision in the

church-state area. The case arose in response to a court order
prohibiting Catholic clergymen from publicizing, in the pulpit or
the religious press, a charitable clothing drive undertaken by a
Catholic youth association for the benefit of needy young people in
underdeveloped countries. A scrap dealer claimed that the youth
group's activity damaged his business in violation of the civil code.

In sustaining the complaint against the judicial decree, the

Constitutional Court argued that the "exercise of religion" must be
"expansively interpreted" to include the church's own conception of
what constitutes religious activity if religious freedom is to enjoy
adequate breathing space in society.
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The court defended its ruling as a natural consequence of the
religiously neutral state. This key passage is worth quoting in full:

In determining what is to be regarded as the free
exercise of religion, we must consider the self-image

of the [relevant] religious or ideological commu
nity. Indeed, the state, which [strives to remain]
neutral in religious matters, must interpret basic
constitutional concepts in terms of neutral, gener
ally applicable viewpoints and not on the basis of
viewpoints associated with a particular confession
or creed. However, in a pluralistic society where
the legal order considers the religious or ideologi

cal self-image [of the individual] as well as the

self-image of those performing rituals associated
with a particular belief, the state would violate
the independence of ideological associations and
their internal freedom to organize accorded by the

Constitution if it did not consider the way these
associations see themselves when interpreting reli
gious activity resulting from a specific confession or
creed.6

The Rumpelkammer court thus concluded that this particular

charitable collection, far from being a "mere social transaction,"

constituted an act of "Christian love" carried out "within the broad

framework of religious consciousness." In an earlier case, however,
the court was careful to point out that not all church activities fall

within the protection of Article 4. For example, churches may be

required to pay taxes on the sale of food and drink or on the rental

of rooms on church property.7 The manifest difficulty in distin

guishing between church activities based on belief and those

calling for normal regulation in the public interest should not

obscure the court's general view that any arguably religious cause is
presumptively immune from burdensome state regulations.

The neutrality demanded of the state in its treatment of religion
finds further expression, finally, in several antidiscrimination
clauses of the Basic Law. The framers clearly had the Nazi experi
ence in mind when they prohibited, in Article 3 (3), the conferral of
any benefit or burden on any person "because of... his religious or
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political opinions." Article 33 (3) likewise bans discriminatio

against any civil or public servant "by reason of his adherence o
nonadherence to a denomination or ideology." The Weimar prov
sions reinforce these antidiscriminatory injunctions by requirin
that the "enjoyment of civil and political rights and eligibility for

public office shall be independent of religious creed," by th
instruction that "[n]o person may be compelled to perform an

religious act. . . or to participate in religious exercises," and by the

command that "[n]o one shall be bound to disclose his religious
convictions." The nondisclosure clause appears to conflict with th
Basic Law's directive under Article 7 (3) that religious instructio
"form part of the ordinary curriculum in state and municipal
schools." That teachers may constitutionally refuse to conduct
classes in religion could easily lead to disclosure of one's religiou

views, but here too the Constitutional Court strains to reconcile

competing rights and values.
Autonomy

Just as the state may not prefer one religion or religious belief over
another it may not intervene in the affairs of the church. One of the

Weimar provisions (Article 137 [3]) directs "[ejvery religious

community [to] regulate and administer its affairs independently
within the limits of law valid for all," a policy that extends from
the selection of church officials to the management of church
related institutions. As the Divided Parish case underlined, citing
the clause just mentioned, "Churches are institutions endowed with
the right to self-determination."8 Accordingly, the Parish court

refused to review a decision by church authorities to split a
religious community served by one parish into two separate
parishes. The decision was an internal church affair, said the

court, and not an exercise of "public authority," thereby making
unavailable any judicial redress of constitutional complaints based
on an asserted violation of certain fundamental rights.
Would the principle of self-determination be sustained in the event
that a religious community impeded the ability of a pastor to hold
a seat in the state or federal parliament? This issue faced Bremen's
constitutional court when called upon to decide whether the state's
Protestant church could constitutionally require one of its ministers
to resign his church office and take a leave of absence during the
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time for which he was elected. The court invalidated the church

rule on both state and federal constitutional grounds. For present
purposes it is sufficient to mention that Article 48 (2) of the Basic
Law provides that "no person may be prevented from accepting and
exercising the office of an [elected] deputy [to the Bundestag]." On

appeal the Federal Constitutional Court quashed the decision of
the state court, holding that there was no conflict between the
church rule and Article 48 and that the church was free in any

event to decide when and under what conditions its ministers could

best carry out their spiritual functions.9 Indeed, the court seemed

impressed with the church's own determination not to mix the

functions of church and state.

In other situations it has not been so easy to draw a clear line

between the sacred and the secular. The relevant clause of the

Weimar Constitution guarantees the church's autonomy "within
the limits of the law valid for all," a clause that subjects the
church and its institutions to all valid laws enacted in pursuit of

the general welfare. Cases involving labor relations and the

management of institutions loosely associated with the church
have caused the greatest difficulty here. Do trade unionists have
the right to enter church institutions such as charitable founda
tions, nursing homes, and hospitals in order to distribute leaflets
and other information pertaining to union membership and the
rights of workers? May a state require all hospitals, including
those under religious auspices, to adopt specified accounting and
managerial practices? May a hospital run by a Catholic order of

nuns prefer its own religiously based system of staff codetermina
tion over the one prescribed by state law? May a Catholic hospita

dismiss a physician known for his advocacy of the right to

abortion?

In all of these cases, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in favor

of the churches and against the applicable state law, in three

instances overruling decisions of the Federal Labor Court.10 Any
state policy, the court suggested, that compromises the mission of
the church, detracts from its religious identity, or undermines its

public credibility as a religious institution committed to a given
way of life, interferes with the autonomy of the church in violation

of the Basic Law. The result in these cases must be understood in

terms of the Constitutional Court's image of the church as a copart
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ner with the state in caring for the needs of its citizens. Because it

provides for a people's spiritual needs, "the church is crucially

important to the life of the state and society,"11 and thus deserves a

special margin of appreciation when its institutional claims

conflict with otherwise valid state law. This perspective does no

diminish the importance of the state's own public policies. I

otherwise valid state interests can be justified by compelling social

or economic reasons and do not affect core church functions or the

self-identity of institutions under the church's control, they are
likely to be upheld.
The policy of nonintervention, however, does not reach as far as the

American principle of nonentanglement. Some supervision of the

church is bound to occur within a constitutional order that confers a

special legal status on religious associations, empowering them to

exercise certain public functions. The church's autonomy is
obviously limited to the extent that the discharge of these

functions invites state regulation in the public interest. By the same
token, when the church exercises authority conferred by law—e.g.,
levying taxes on its members—state supervision may be necessary
for the proper administration of the resulting rules. It may also be
necessary, as noted below, to insure that the church administers a
state sanctioned practice so as not to interfere with the free exercise
of religion.
Accommodation

The scheme of church-state relations under the Basic Law of the

Federal Republic of Germany conforms to a deeply rooted German

tradition. In this tradition, which emphasized the complementar
ity if not the unity of a people's spiritual and physical existence,

the church enjoyed a rank coordinate with the state in the

governance of society. As institutions of equal rank within what
was assumed to be a common universal community, they ordered

their joint endeavors and settled their disputes by means of
concordats or treaties, a practice that continues to this day.

Although the theory of coordination would be eclipsed in the course
of time by the rising tide of rationalism and secularism, leading to
the complete supremacy of the state in public affairs, the churches
would in the twentieth century retain many of their old connections
to the political city.12
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Thus, as noted at the outset, West Germany combines elements of
both separation and accommodation. The Basic Law prohibits the

establishment of a state church—its separationist tilt—but it

nevertheless confers upon religious groups the status of "corporate
bodies under public law," in which capacity they "shall be entitled
to levy taxes [on wage earners] in accordance with the state (Land)
law on the basis of civil taxation lists." In addition, the

Constitution reaffirms the right of the church to own property, t
establish affiliated institutions, and to receive "state contribu

tions" as prescribed by law. It also obliges the state to recognize

Sunday and other religious holidays as "days ... of spiritual

edification," and guarantees the church's right to provide religious

services, when needed, in prisons, hospitals, and other public

institutions. These provisions of the Weimar Constitution, carried
over into the Basic Law, are best understood in the light of history,
that is, not only as an effort to secure the autonomy of the church in

the face of Bismarck's Kulturkampf but also to compensate the
church for the financial losses it had sustained by the state's
seizure of church property and the dissolution of religious orders

and congregations.

The Basic Law itself provides for still other connections between
church and state. Article 7, although placing the "entire educa
tional system under state supervision," confers upon parents the
"right to decide whether [their children] shall receive religious

instruction," makes such instruction "a part of the ordinary

curriculum in state and municipal schools," and permits the estab
lishment, subject to state approval, of publicly supported denomi
national schools. Religious instruction is not permitted in purely
secular schools, although in other public or interdenominational
schools such instruction "shall be given in accordance with the
tenets of the religious communities." As noted above, however,

parents may decline to have their children attend classes in

religion, just as the Basic Law bars the state from compelling a

teacher to conduct such classes.

In the light of their reserved power over the fields of culture and

education, the states (Lander) are free to adopt policies based on
their various religious and political traditions. Nearly all the
state governments have negotiated treaties or concordats with the
Protestant churches and the Vatican—in recent years such treaties
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have been concluded with the Jewish community and other

religious groups—covering such matters as the legal status of
churches, religious education in the public schools, construction of
confessional schools, observance of religious holidays, maintenance

of church property, appointment of bishops, and dismissal of
members of theological faculties.13 Needless to say, any detailed
reference to these church-state agreements, or to the decisions of
state constitutional courts interpreting them, would take us far
afield. It is sufficient to note that any comprehensive treatment of

church-state relations in West Germany would have to take this
massive body of law into account.

Two problems, nevertheless, have warranted the special attention
of the Federal Constitutional Court, one dealing with the church
tax and the other with religious activities in state schools. The
typical complaint against the church tax is that its application to
a particular person violates freedom of conscience or religion.

Invariably, the court strikes down the tax when applied to

"unchurched" persons or to others who have given formal notice of
their withdrawal from the church. The system itself, however, is

beyond constitutional challenge. As presently operated, state

revenue offices collect the tax on behalf of the churches and then

distribute the proceeds to the major denominations proportionate to
their respective memberships. The tax takes the form of an eight to

ten percent surcharge, withheld by the employer, on a wage

earner's net income tax, but here too the court has exercised

considerable vigilance, in one case nullifying the levy on the income

of the spouse who filed a joint income tax return with his

"churched" wife but who himself was not a member of the church.14
The educational context has also been a fertile source of

constitutional rulings. As with the church tax, religious educatio

is sanctioned by the Constitution; it enjoys a legitimate plac

within the public school curriculum so long as the state respects the

religious or nonreligious choices of students and teachers. Indeed

most constitutional commentators defend such instruction as a

manifestation of the free exercise of religion. As the Concordat case

made clear, however, freedom of religion does not obligate the

state to establish confessional schools.15 It may, if it chooses, even

in opposition to a national treaty, establish interdenominational

schools as the standard form of elementary and secondary education
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so long as the need for religious education can be met within this
framework. The problem is that this need cannot as a practical
matter be extended to all religious groups. Small Christian sects
often do not meet those imperatives of size and durability that
would constitutionally entitle them to religious instruction in public

schools. Whether and to what extent religious instruction or
separate confessional schools shall be provided for some 300,000

Moslem students—the children of foreign workers resident in West
Germany—is presently a troubling constitutional issue.
Equally troubling is the problem of religious influences or practices

outside the structure of formal religious education. Two cases are
considerably important here. In the first, the Constitutional Court

upheld the right of the state to establish interdenominational
schools with a general Christian orientation; in the second, it
sustained the validity of a nondenominational prayer in such
schools. In each case the court sought to reconcile the

"constitutional value of [religious] tolerance" with the

"safeguarding of state independence in matters of school organiza

tion." Christian references within the context of secular courses,

said the court, do "not refer to the truth of belief" but rather to "the

recognition of Christianity as a formative cultural and educational
fact." The court cautioned, however, that public schools may not be

transformed into "missionary schools," "may not require any

commitment to articles of Christian faith," and must "remain open

to other ideological and religious ideas." In the prayer case too,
said the court, tolerance required equal concern and respect for the
rights of believers and unbelievers; participation in prayer must be
voluntary and the exercise ordered in such a way as to preserve the
rights of all. As in most cases such as this, the court scrutinizes the
facts carefully in an effort to reconcile the negative right to be free

of religious compulsion with the positive right to religious

expression.16
Conclusion

The German perspective on church-state relations, as this brief

survey shows, contrasts sharply with the official American

position, which is one largely of dogmatic separation. Indeed, any
attempt in Germany to drive church and state into sharply divided

10
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compartments, where the twain shall never meet, would in th
prevailing view seriously offend the freedom to practice one's
religion. An echo of this prevailing German attitude can be hear
in those American constitutional cases where the Supreme Cour
has had to balance the value of nonestablishment against claim

asserted under the free exercise clause.

Both German and American constitutionalism require the state to be

neutral with respect to religion, but neutrality means different
things in the two systems. To Americans neutrality means tolera
tion and no public support; to Germans it means encouragement and
at least some public support. The American perspective reflects an

essentially negative view of religion's role in the nation's public
life, whereas the German perspective sees religion as a needed
participant in the public sphere. Finally, the Basic Law adheres to
the principle of separation, but in the German understanding of the

term this does not imply the impenetrable wall of disassociation
erected in American constitutional law. The German system permits

and even encourages a measurable degree of cooperation between
throne and altar so long as each respects the autonomy of the other
and the state favors no one religion over another.

West Germany provides Americans with an interesting model of

how a liberal, pluralistic democracy—and a highly secularized
one at that—might order the relationship between church and

state. Indeed, the accommodationist stance of German constitu

tional law is often defended as a means of maintaining pluralism
and diversity in the face of powerful secularizing trends toward
social uniformity and moral rootlessness. Secular critics of the

current modus vivendi have pointed out, however, that the

church's financial connection to the state allows it to exert

excessive influence in the political realm. Some religious critics, o
the other hand, see the influence running the other way, with th
church serving as a captive of the liberal state, aligning itself wit
existing power structures and compromising its spiritual missi
There is probably some truth in both propositions. Still, the syste
appears to work to the benefit of both church and state and in th

absence of the agitated political strife often stirred up by th
religious presence in American politics. Church and state
separate in Germany but no Berlin wall divides them. The

11
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'Article 140 of the Basic Law incorporates Articles 136, 137, 138,

139, and 141 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. These articles
reaffirm various liberties of conscience and specify in considerable

detail the rights and privileges of religious organizations. Under
Article 140, the Weimar articles constitute "an integral part of this

Basic Law," placing them on the same plane of constitutional

legality and protection as any other provision of the Basic Law.
2See Church Construction Tax Case, Judgment of December 14,1965,
19 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (hereafter cited
as BVerfGE), p. 216.

3In the Tobacco-Atheist case, for example, the Federal

Constitutional Court sustained the denial of parole to a prisoner, an

ex-Nazi stormtrooper, because he promised to reward his fellow
inmates with packages of tobacco if they would abandon their
religious faith. The Court felt that such tactics, which appeal to
the lowest of human instincts, violated the Basic Law's "general
order of values," especially the principle of human dignity. "A
person who exploits the special circumstances of penal servitude
and promises and rewards someone with luxury goods in order to
make him renounce his beliefs," said the Court, "does not enjoy the
benefit of the protection of Art. 4, Sec. 1, of the Basic Law." See 12

BVerfGE 4-5 (1960). The quotation is from the English translation

of this case, which appears in Walter F. Murphy and Joseph
Tanenhaus, Comparative Constitutional Law (New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1977), p. 467.
4See, respectively, Witness Oath Case, 33 BVerfGE 23 (1972), Blood
Transfusion Case, 32 BVerfGE 98 (1971), and Crucifix Case, 35

BVerfGE 366 (1973).

524 BVerfGE 236 (1968).

6Ibid., pp. 247-248. The translation of this passage has been taken

from Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the

Federal Republic of Germany (Durham and London: Duke

University Press, 1989), p. 449.
nWatch Tower Bible and Tract Society Case, 19 BVerfGE 229 (1965).
818 BVerfGE 385 (1965).

9Bremen Evangelical Church Case, 42 BVerfGE 312 (1976).
10See, respectively, Union Recruiting Case, 57 BVerfGE 220 (1981),
Marien Hospital Case, 53 BVerfGE 366 (1980), Goch Hospital Case,
46 BVerfGE 73 (1977), and St. Elizabeth Hospital Case, 70 BVerfGE
138 (1985).

12
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nSee Evangelical Church Case, supra note 9 at 331.
12An excellent treatment of the "coordination theory" and its
contemporary manifestations, including sharp criticisms of the
theory, is contained in Klaus G. Meyer-Teschendorf, Staat und
Kirche itn pluralistischen Gemeinwesen (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr
[Paul Siebeck], 1979, pp. 1-52.
I3The terms and interpretation of these treaties embrace a large
portion of Staatskirchenrecht, a major subject of legal study in
Germany often taught by constitutional lawyers. The best and most
up-to-date study of these church-state agreements is Joseph Listl,

Die Konkordate und Kirchenvertriige in der Bundesrepublik

Deutschland. 2 vols. (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1987).

14For a summary of the leading cases, see Ingo von Munch,

Grundgesetz Kommentar, second edition (Munich: Verlag C. H.
Beck, 1983), vol. 3, pp. 1326-1334.
156 BVerfGE 309 (1957).
16The two cases are the Interdenominational School Case, 41

BVerfGE 29 (1975) and School Prayer Case, 52 BVerfGE 223 (1979).
An English translation of these cases appears in Kommers, supra
note 6, at pp. 466-477.
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